By: Yadullah Shahibzadeh

A few weeks ago the Iranian parliament passed a new election law on simultaneous presidential and local elections. This new law has two obvious outcomes. The first outcome of the new law is postponement of the expected local elections in the early 2011 for one year and a half. The second outcome of the election law is that the current members of the local councils keep their seat until June 2013.[1]

The main argument supporting the parliament decision concerning the new election law was that frequent elections in Iran generate unnecessary political excitement and extreme politicization in the Iranian society and the political system. According to this argument the ‘over-politicization’ of the political system has been the main cause of the underperformance of the executive branch.

Despite the serious political dispute which started since the 2009 presidential elections neither the reform oriented minority in the parliament nor did the leaders of the opposition such as Mousavi and Karubi oppose the suspension of the 2011 local elections. In fact the new election law had little to do with the political crisis that followed the last presidential election. The silence of the reform oriented political forces on the issue seems to indicate their indifference to the elections or their distrust in any election that the current government might hold.

One expects that Ahamdinezhad’s government supports the new elections law and its consequence namely the delay in the local election which could give his government more space to continue its work without unexpected political excitements which could pose a threat to his government. But, surprisingly he opposed the new election law.[2] Why did Ahmadinezhad oppose a law which seemed to have deprived his opponents another opportunity to assemble their forces and challenge his government in every single community through out Iran?

In fact Ahamdinezhad had no problem with the simultaneous presidential and local elections.[3] His main problem was with the continuation of the current councils for a year and a half since he hoped to get rid of the rest of his opponents in the local councils. Ahamdinezhad is well aware that the absolute majority of the members of the local councils in Iran are not his supporters. The current members of the councils belong either to the reform oriented forces or to the major moderate or pragmatic tendencies within the conservative faction. And now with the new election arrangement he has to live with them until his turn in office is over.

The disagreement between the Ahmadinezhad government on one side and the parliament and the Expediency Council on other side on the new elections is another expression of the political conflict which is going on within the conservative faction. While according to the new law the term of current councils are extended to 2013, Ahmadinezhad insisted on holding local elections as planned in the early 2011 even though the elected members of the councils had only one year and a half to sit in the councils.

The decision to pass the new election law which includes postponing of the 201l local elections imply the distrust of the parliament and the Expediency Council in Ahmadinezhad’s government to hold a fair and free election by the accepted standards of electoral competition in the Islamic Republic. It seems that after the dispute over the 2009 presidential election results these institutions of the Islamic Republic cannot trust the Ahmadinezhad government to hold another election since they are afraid that instead of competitive local elections his government would deliver an election with a surprising result in favor of his own government.

It seems that Ahmadinezhad has several reasons for his dissatisfaction with the local councils. He may consider these new institutions a threat to his authoritarian politics since the local councils remind him of the little support he has among the local population in general and among the local elite in particular. There are various concrete reasons for Ahmadinezhd’s lack of support in the local communities.

His government has a total disregard for local opinion and the expectations of the local elite. For instance, after his presidency in 2005, his government appointed a provincial governor for the southern province of Bushehr. Though the governor was conservative by orientation he received the support of the local elite. But this governor was not considered a loyal supporter of Ahmadinezhad, so he was replaced by a commander of the revolutionary guard in the summer of 2008.[4]

The reason for the replacement of a governor who received solid support of the local elite with a commander of the revolutionary guard seems to have become clear after the 2009 presidential election results. Here is a symptomatic question which can be applicable to any other province or region in Iran: Can we find a connection between the results of the 2009 presidential election in the pro-reform region of Bushehr and the replacement of a conservative but seemingly disloyal governor with a commander of the revolutionary guard?

[1] Khaney-e Melat, Khabar Gozariy-e Majles Shoray-e Eslami, 04.08.2010

[2] http://www.aftabnews.ir/vdcfxjdyew6dxva.igiw.html

[3] http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/pages/?cid=11919

[4] http://www.nasimjonoub.com/sardabir/showblog.asp?id=188